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NOTES
HABEAS CORPUS-Infants-Federal Habeas Corpus Ju-
risdiction Does Not Lie to Consider Collateral Challenges to
State Court Judgments Involuntarily Terminating Parental
Rights. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services
Agency, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982).
In Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services
Agency' the United States Supreme Court in a six to three
decision2 held that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction does
not extend to consideration of collateral challenges to state
court judgments involving the custody of children or the in-
voluntary termination of parental rights.3 Lehman had peti-
tioned for a writ of habeas corpus asserting the
unconstitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute under which
her parental rights had been terminated.4
1. 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982).
2. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor joined. Justice Blackmun
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.'
3. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3240.
4. In June 1971, Ms. Lehman, then age 39, was living with her three sons, then
ages seven, five and one. At that time she was pregnant with her youngest daughter,
Tracie. Tracie lived with her mother after her birth. Ms. Lehman's eldest child,
Carol, lived with Ms. Lehman's parents for many years and Ms. Lehman did not seek
her return. In June 1971, while pregnant with Tracie, Ms. Lehman voluntarily sur-
rendered custody of her three sons to the Lycoming County Children's Services
Agency.
In November 1974, more than three years after she had surrendered custody of
her sons, Ms. Lehman requested that the boys be returned to her. The Agency con-
cluded that Ms. Lehman could not provide her sons with necessary support and su-
pervision and declined to return them. The Agency then filed a petition seeking
termination of Ms. Lehman's parental rights in her three sons. Lehman v. Lycoming
County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135, 136-37 (3d Cir. 1981).
Ms. Lehman was unmarried and had been supervised by the Agency for a number
of years because of her mental incapacity and unsanitary living conditions. A
caseworker testified that the Lehman home was roach infested and unfit for habita-
tion by children. At one time school authorities would not allow Tracie to go to
school because she had lice.
Ms. Lehman had an IQ of 43 and a mental age of six years, 11 months. Although
she had completed the seventh grade in school, she did not know how to read. A
psychologist testified that Ms. Lehman had limited communication skills and showed
considerable difficulty in comprehending simple ideas concerning housework, cook-
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I. THE LEHMAN DECISION
The Lehman decision was based in part upon the Court's
analysis of the federal habeas corpus statute's 5 custody re-
quirement.6 The Court noted7 that although the scope of
federal habeas corpus has been extended beyond the strict
requirement of actual physical custody, past decisions have
limited the federal writ's availability to challenge state court
judgments to situations where a petitioner, as a result of a
state court criminal conviction, has suffered "substantial re-
straints not shared by the public generally."' 8 The Court
found that since the Lehman children were not prisoners
and did not suffer any restrictions imposed by a state crimi-
nal justice system, they were not "in custody" within the
meaning of the statutory requirement.9 The Court reasoned
that the children were in the custody of their foster parents
in essentially the same way and to the same extent that other
ing and childcare. The psychologist concluded in her psychological evaluation that
Ms. Lehman lacked the social maturity and intellectual capability to cope with the
continuing responsibilities of raising children. On the basis of these facts, the Penn-
sylvania court terminated Ms. Lehman's parental rights. In re William L., 477 Pa.
322, - 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (1978).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the termination order. Id at _ 383
A.2d at 1232. Ms. Lehman then sought the United States Supreme Court's review in
a petition for certiorari. The petition was denied. Lehman v. Lycoming County Chil-
dren's Servs. Agency, 439 U.S. 880 (1978). Ms. Lehman then filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania. The district court dismissed the petition without a hearing, concluding that
"the custody maintained by the respondent over the three Lehman children is not the
type of custody to which the federal habeas corpus remedy may be addressed." Leh-
man v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, No. 79-65 (M.D. Pa. - 1979).
Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's order of dismissal. Ms. Lehman sought Supreme Court review in a petition
for certiorari. The petition was granted and the Supreme Court affirmed. Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 102 S. Ct. 3231, 3240 (1982).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
6. Id § 2254(a) provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that
he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.
7. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 102 S. Ct. 3231, 3236-
37 (1982).
8. See Hensley v. Municipal Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973); Carafas v. LaVallee,
391 U.S. 234, 237, 239 (1968); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963).
9. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3237.
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children are in the custody of their natural or adoptive par-
ents and, thus, suffered no restraints on liberty not shared by
children in the general populace.' 0 The Court concluded
that under such circumstances extension of the federal writ
to challenges to state child custody decisions would be an
unprecedented expansion of the jurisdiction of lower federal
courts. "1
Next, the Court discussed prudential considerations mili-
tating against the extension of federal habeas corpus juris-,
diction. Recognizing the writ as a major exception to the
doctrine of res judicata,12 the Court noted the comity and
federalism concerns 13 raised by the "unparalleled assertion
of federal authority over the state judicial system"' 4 implicit
in the assumption of habeas corpus jurisdiction by a federal
court over challenges to state court judgments.' 5 The Court
found that the implication of these principles, when coupled
with the exceptional need for finality in child custody dis-
putes,' 6 argues strongly against the extension of federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction beyond its historic limits.' 7
Finally, the Court recognized that habeas corpus has
been used in child custody cases in England and in many of
the states 8 and that the federal habeas corpus statute au-
thorizing federal court collateral review of federal decisions
10. Id The Court noted that Ms. Lehman was not really litigating the validity of
the state's assumption of custody; she simply sought to relitigate through federal
habeas corpus the interest in her own parental rights.
11. Id at 3238. The Court, in making this determination, took into consideration
the "special solicitude" traditionally shown by federal courts for state interests in the
area of family law.
12. Id See also Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648
F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1981), ajf'd, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982).
13. Whenever the federal habeas corpus remedy is used to challenge a state court
judgment a single federal judge is given the power to overrule determinations of fed-
eral issues made by a state's highest court. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3236 n.9.
14. Id at 3238 n.17 (quoting Lehman, 648 F.2d at 139).
15. Id at 3238 (quoting Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers,
584 F.2d 1103, 1111-12 (Ist Cir. 1978)).
16. The Court found the state's interest in finality to be unusually strong in child
custody disputes because children require secure, long-term relationships that are free
of unnecessary uncertainty. The extended duration of custody litigation resulting
from a grant of federal habeas corpus would only prolong this detrimental insecurity.
Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3238-39.
17. Id at 3238.
18. Id at 3239.
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can be construed to include child custody cases.19 However,
the Court found reliance on what may be appropriate within
the federal system or within the state system to be "of little
force" in determining what is appropriate between the fed-
eral and state systems. 20 The federal writ should be reserved
"for those instances in which the federal interest in individ-
ual liberty is so strong that it outweighs federalism and final-
ity concerns.'
In his dissenting opinion,22 Justice Blackmun objected to
the Court's finding of a jurisdictional, as opposed to a discre-
tionary, bar to federal habeas corpus relief.23 In his view,
the literal statutory requirements for federal habeas jurisdic-
tion had been satisfied. 24 In particular, Justice Blackmun
noted the petitioner's fulfillment of the statutory custody re-
quirement.25 Emphasizing that the federal writ "is not now
and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy, 26
Justice Blackmun pointed out that for centuries the English
and American law courts have had the undisputed power or
jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus writs in child custody
cases. 27 He found it significant that the Court in Jones v.
Cunningham,28 a case involving a criminal conviction,29 ex-
pressly relied on the use of habeas corpus in child custody
cases at English common law for its expansion of the scope
19. Id
20. Id
21. Id at 3240. The Court did not consider the state's custody of a child assumed
pursuant to state court termination of parental rights to be a severe enough restraint
on individual liberty to outweigh federalism and finality concerns. Id at 3240 n.19
(quoting Hensley v. Municipal Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973)).
22. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
23. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. 3231, 3240-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See infra note
35.
24. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3240 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. Id
26. Id (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)).
27. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3240-41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
28. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
29. Justice Blackmun found the majority's reading of Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. 236 (1963), Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) and Hensley v. Municipal
Ct., 411 U.S. 345 (1963) restrictive. None of these decisions drew any distinction
between criminal and civil detention. Rather, they declared in broad and encompass-
ig language that habeas corpus must be made widely available as a remedy for se-
vere restraints on individual liberty. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3242-43 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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of federal habeas from a requirement of actual physical re-
straint to one of any significant restraint on liberty not im-
posed upon the public generally.30
Justice Blackmun went on to note that the petitioner's
children did indeed suffer restraints not imposed on children
in the public generally.3' Although children generally are
restricted by their natural or adoptive parents, they are not
generally so restricted by the state. 32 Such restraint, there-
fore, constitutes "custody" within the meaning of the statu-
tory requirement.3
Next, Justice Blackmun objected that, while concerns of
federalism and the need for finality are present in child cus-
tody disputes, these concerns do not deprive federal courts of
habeas corpus jurisdiction.34 The real question, in his esti-
mation, is not whether the Court has power to issue a writ of
habeas corpus in state child custody cases but whether con-
siderations of federalism and the exceptional need for final-
ity render the exercise of habeas corpus power inappropriate
in these cases.35
Justice Blackmun was of the opinion that the writ should
have been denied to Ms. Lehman,36 not on the basis ofjuris-
30. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3242-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 3243.
32. Id Because the Lehman children were wards of the state, Blackmun ob-
served, it is the state that decides where they will live, reserves the right to move them
to new physical settings, consents to their marriage, to their enlistment in the armed
forces and to any major decisions regarding medical, psychiatric and surgical
treatment.
33. Id In light of the Supreme Court's extension of federal habeas corpus juris-
diction to cases where the person "in custody" was merely on unattached, inactive
Army reserve duty, Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341 (1972), or had been released on his
own recognizance, Hensley v. Municipal Ct., 411 U.S. 345 (1978), Blackmun had dif-
ficulty finding that minor children who, as wards of the state, are fully subject to state
court custody orders, are not sufficiently restrained to be deemed "in custody" for
federal habeas corpus purposes. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3243 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
34. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3243 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35. Id Justice Blackmun noted that althpugh the Court's decisions involving fed-
eral habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions have recognized concerns of
federalism and finality, the Court has expressly separated the question of jurisdiction
to issue a writ of habeas corpus from the question of whether "in some circumstances
considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal jus-
tice require a federal court to forego the exercise of its habeas corpus power." Id
(quoting Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1976)).
36. When a justice agrees with a majority's holding but disagrees with the reason-
ing upon which that holding was based, he writes a concurring opinion. Nevertheless,
Justice Blackmun chose to label his concurring opinion a dissent.
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diction, but as a discretionary matter because Ms. Lehman
was not a proper "next friend"37 to apply for the federal writ
in behalf of her children.38 Ms. Lehman lacked standing, ac-
cording to Justice Blackmun,39 because she acted not in the
interest of her children, but in the interest of her own paren-
tal rights.40 He concluded that discretion to withhold federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction exists in all but the most ex-
traordinary cases4' and that a discretionary denial of review
based on petitioner's lack of standing "would not have been
inconsistent with the Court's decision . . . which expressly
bases denial of habeas relief on a need to reserve the federal
writ 'for those instances in which the federal interest in indi-
vidual liberty is so strong that it outweighs federalism and
finality concerns.' "42
II. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
A. The Jurisdictional Requirement of "Custody"
The United States Constitution guarantees that the
"privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it."' 43 This guarantee is imple-
mented through the federal habeas corpus statutes4 which
set forth jurisdictional prerequisites that must be met before
a federal court is empowered to entertain a petition for
37. The term "next friend" is derived from case law construction of the statute
which provides that "[a]pplication for a writ of habeas corpus shall be. . .verified by
the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2242 (1976) (emphasis added).
38. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3244 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
39. Id at 3245.
40. If Ms. Lehman brought the habeas corpus action to vindicate her own paren-
tal rights she could not be filing the petition in behalf of her child. See supra note 37.
41. An "extraordinary case" exists where there is a strong reason to believe that
the conditions of the child's confinement unconstitutionally deprived that child of its
liberty and that release of the child to its natural parent very likely would be in the
child's best interest. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. 3245 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42. Id (quoting Powell, J., Id at 3240).
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
44. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963); Note, The Use of Federal
Habeas Corpus in Child Custody Disputes, 31 ME. L. REv. 265, 267-68 (1980).
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habeas corpus. 4 5 Although the custody requirement is an
important jurisdictional prerequisite, 46 it has never been de-
fined either by the statutes or by the Constitution.47 Conse-
quently, federal courts have relied on traditional common-
law usage of the writ in England48 and in many of the
states49 for guidance in defining the requirement's scope.50
In both England and the United States "custody" in
terms of actual physical restraint5 has been required in the
majority of cases.5 2 English courts, however, have long rec-
ognized the use of habeas corpus where something less than
45. Note, Federal Habeas Corpus in Child Custody Cases, 67 VA. L. REv. 1423,
1433 (1981). 28 U.S.C § 2254 (1976) provides in relevant part:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that
he is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in cus-
tody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it
appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective
process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner.
46. See Note, supra note 45, at 1434. See also Developments in the Law-Federal
Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038, 1072 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments in the Law].
47. See Note, supra note 44, at 268-69. See also Developments in the Law, supra
note 46, at 1072.
48. See Exparte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 21 (1876). This case stated:
The general principles upon which the writ of habeas corpus is issued in Eng-
land were well settled by usage and statutes long before the period of our na-
tional independence, and must have been in the mind of Congress when the
power to issue the writ was given to the courts and judges of the United States.
See also Note, supra note 44 at 269-72. See generally Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the
States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 243, 270-74 (1965).
49. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 46.
50. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 234, 238.40 & nn.8, 12-13 (1963); McNally v.
Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934); Note, supra note 44, at 269; Note, Federal Habeas
Corpus Relief Unavailable to Parent in Child Custody Dispute, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REv.
337, 343 (1981); Note, supra note 45, at 1434.
51. Historically, a person "in custody" was able to obtain a writ of habeas corpus
only if subject to tangible physical restraints. Developments in the Law, supra note 46,
at 1073. Such a strict construction was necessary because of the procedural require-
ment that the petitioner's custodian "produce the body" of the petitioner before the
court and show cause why the petitioner should not be released. Furthermore, the
only habeas remedy available was immediate release. Id at 1072, 1079; Note, supra
note 45, at 1435.
52. Note, supra note 45, at 1435.
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strict physical confinement is in issue. Recently, the
United States Supreme Court expanded the writ's scope to
include "other restraints on a man's liberty, restraints not
shared by the public generally. ' 54 The custody requirement
has been met by persons on parole,5 5 persons released on
their own recognizance,56 persons unconditionally released
from prison after filing a habeas petition 57 and persons on
unattached, inactive army reserve duty. 8
Moreover, the writ has been widely used in child custody
cases in England,5 9 in many of the states60 and in a number
of federal courts.61 Nevertheless, federal courts generally
have refused to recognize habeas jurisdiction 62 where a state
53. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238-39 (1963).
54. Id at 240.
55. Id
56. Hensley v. Municipal Ct., 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
57. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
58. Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341 (1972).
59. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239 (1963); Note, supra note 44, at 269-
72.
60. See, e.g., Walden v. Walden, 355 So. 2d 372 (Ala. Ct. App. 1978); Morales v.
Glenn, 114 Ariz. 327, 560 P.2d 1234 (1977); Cappar v. Cappar, 402 So. 2d 1284 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Matter of Anderson, 99 Idaho 805, 589 P.2d 957 (1978); Mitchell
v. Henderson, 65 Ill. App. 3d 363, 382 N.E.2d 650 (1978); Slidell v. Valentine, 298
N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1980); Bryant v. Kentucky Dep't for Human Resources, 548
S.W.2d 165 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Buchanan v. Malone, 415 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App.
1982); Exparte Ray, 573 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Application of Bertelson,
- Mont. -, 617 P.2d 121 (1980); Schleuter v. McCuiston, 203 Neb. 101, 277 N.W.2d
667 (1979); E.E.B. v. D.A., 89 N.J. 595, 446 A.2d 871 (1982); Bartlett v. Hollenbeck,
100 Misc. 2d 748,420 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1979); Angle v. Children's Serv. Div., 63 Ohio St.
2d 227, 407 N.E.2d 524 (1980); State ex rel Butler v. Morgan, 34 Or. App. 393, 578
P.2d 814 (1978); Commonwealth ex rel Laws v. Laws, 249 Pa. Super. 349, 378 A.2d
333 (1977); State ex rel Summers v. Wulffenstein, 571 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1977); Ander-
son v. Anderson, 36 Wis. 2d 455, 153 N.W.2d 627 (1967).
61. Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1110
(1st Cir. 1978).
62. Attempts to gain writs of federal habeas corpus to challenge state child cus-
tody determinations have not been made until recently. Lehman v. Lycoming County
Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135, 155 (3d Cir. 1981) (concurring opinion), affid,
102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982). The most relied upon authority for federal court refusal to
recognize federal habeas jurisdiction over state child custody judgments is Supreme
Court dictum that the subject of domestic relations belongs to the states. See Matters
v. Ryan, 249 U.S. 375 (1919); Exparte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890). Nevertheless, the
dictum underlying the judicially carved domestic relations exception to federal juris-
diction has been blindly accepted by the federal lower courts. Note, supra note 44, at
275. See Lehman, 648 F.2d at 146; Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wan-
derers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1110 (1st Cir. 1978). See also Doe v. Doe, 660 F.2d 101 (4th
Cir. 1981); Syrovatka v. Erlich, 608 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935
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child custody judgment is challenged.63
The Lehman Court, in line with a number of lower fed-
eral court decisions,6 based its refusal to recognize federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction in part upon a finding that chil-
dren in the custody of foster parents are not in the custody of
the state within the meaning of federal habeas corpus stat-
utes because they do not suffer restraints not shared by chil-
dren in the public generally.65 The Court reasoned that
children in the custody of foster parents are "in custody" in
essentially the same way as other children are in the custody
of their natural or adoptive parents.66 Furthermore, the fact
that children in the custody of foster or adoptive parents are
considered to be "in custody" for purposes of habeas corpus
jurisdiction within a single judicial system-that is, where
the writ is issued by an English court to a person in English
custody, by a state court to a person in state custody or by a
federal court to a person in federal custody-is not, accord-
ing to Lehman, authority for finding such children "in cus-
tody" for purposes of federal habeas jurisdiction over state
court judgments67 because federal jurisdiction over state
child custody judgments "represents a profound interference
with state judicial systems and the finality of state
decisions. 68
It is well established that custodial restraints on a minor
child are a sufficient deprivation of liberty to be challenged
by way of habeas corpus.69 And, as previously noted, habeas
(1980); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978); Tree Top v. Smith, 577
F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1978). Cf. Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981).
63. Note, supra note 45, at 1434 & n.86. See infra text accompanying note 68.
64. See supra note 62.
65. See supra text accompanying note 9.
66. See supra text accompanying note 10.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
68. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 102 S. Ct. 3231, 3240
(1982). The Court held that the writ should be reserved for severe restraints where
the federal interest in individual liberty is so strong that it outweighs federalism and
finality concerns.
69. Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975); Note, supra
note 44, at 272 (the majority of American states accept the English view that a child's
absence from the parent's legal custody is equivalent to illegal restraint on the child
and that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for such restraint). The writ has the
capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291
(1969).
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has been widely used in child custody cases in England, in
the majority of states and in a number of the federal courts.7 °
The common law writ was clearly recognized as an appro-
priate remedy in child custody disputes.7' The children in-
volved in all of these cases unquestionably were considered
to be "in custody" for purposes of habeas corpus. Although
concerns of federalism and a state's interest in finality may
be implicated when a federal court seeks to interfere with a
state court's judicial determinations, 72 these considerations
can have no bearing on whether the jurisdictional require-
ment of custody has been met.73 These principles may sup-
port refusal to exercise habeas corpus power.74 They do not,
however, deprive federal courts of statutory jurisdiction.75
The overwhelming weight of applicable precedent clearly in-
dicates that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction exists to chal-
lenge state child custody judgments.76 The question is
whether federal-state comity considerations render inappro-
priate the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction.77
The Court's finding that the Lehman children suffered no
restraints not common to children in the public generally78 is
equally untenable. Admittedly, some form of control, pa-
rental or otherwise, exists over all children.79  However,
there is a sharp distinction between private parental control
and the type of control exerted over children who have be-
come wards of the state. For these children, personal, indi-
vidual guidance is replaced by state power over even the
70. See supra notes 59-61.
71. Note, supra note 50, at 341-42 & n.20. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406
(1963) ("[T]he Constitution invites, yet does not compel, . . . a generous construction
of the power of federal courts to dispense the writ conformably with common law
practice.").
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
73. See Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3240 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
75. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3240 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); See Note, supra note
45, at 1434 ("Because the writ operates as a significant federal intrusion into the state
judicial system, concerns of federal-state comity have also influenced the interpretation
of the custody requirement." (emphasis added)).
76. Lehman, 648 F.2d at 166, affid, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982).
77. Id
78. See supra text accompanying note 10.
79. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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most mundane affairs of life. This is not the type of restraint
suffered by children in the public generally.
B. Prudential Considerations
The Lehman Court sought additional support for its find-
ing that federal courts lack habeas corpus jurisdiction to
consider collateral attacks on state child custody decisions
from commonly relied upon prudential considerations.8 0
The subjects of child custody, divorce and alimony or sup-
port obligations traditionally have been thought to be wholly
within the province of the state courts.8' Cases recognize the
experience and expertise of state agencies and courts in
resolving family disputes and the strong interest of the state
in addressing without federal interference such peculiarly lo-
cal matters.8 2 Habeas corpus, as a major exception to res
judicata,8 3 significantly interferes with a state's interest in the
finality of any of its judgments.8 4 The exceptional need for
finality in child custody disputes s5 magnifies the effect of this
interference.8 6 Lehman held that the federalism and finality
concerns implicated by such an extraordinary interference
with a state's judicial system outweigh the federal interest in
liberty in all but cases of special urgency where restraints on
liberty are immediate and severe.8 7 Finding the requisite se-
verity or special urgency lacking in child custody cases, the
Court denied jurisdiction. 8
80. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
81. Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Doe v. Doe, 660
F.2d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1981); Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers,
584 F.2d 1103, 1109 n.9 (1st Cir. 1978); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d 348, 349
(Ist Cir. 1974).
82. Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978); Sylvander v. New
England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1109 n.9 (1st Cir. 1978); Note,
supra note 44, at 280.
83. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 102 S. Ct. 3231,
3238-39 (1982).
84. Id. at 3238-39 (1982); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981); Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1981), affd,
102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982); Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584
F.2d 1103, 1111-12 (1st Cir. 1978).
85. See supra note 16.
86. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. 3231, 3240 (1982); Sylvander v. New England Home for
Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1112 (1st Cir. 1978).
87. Id at 3240.
88. Id
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The federal courts essentially have created an exception
to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in child custody cases89
on the basis of Supreme Court dictum that the entire subject
of domestic relations belongs to the laws of the states.90 In-
terestingly, the holding of the decision in which this blindly
accepted dictum is found provides anything but support for
the judicially carved exception. 9' In Ex parte Burrus92 the
Court dismissed a habeas petition in a private custody dis-
pute for want of a federal question. The Court did not hold
that federal courts lack habeas jurisdiction in all child cus-
tody cases. It held, rather, that federal jurisdiction is lacking
where the child's custody is not alleged to be in violation of
federal law.93 The obvious implication is that federal habeas
jurisdiction would indeed lie where a petitioner's claim is
grounded in terms of a violation of constitutional or other
federal law. Significantly, the Court expressly left open the
question of whether federal courts would have habeas
corpus jurisdiction over a state child custody judgment in the
absence of a federal question where the citizenship of the
parties contesting the custody is diverse.94
The decision upon which the child custody or domestic
relations exception is based supports a finding of federal
habeas jurisdiction where the constitutional validity of a
state statute terminating parental rights is challenged.95
Thus, while prudential considerations of federal-state comity
generally dictate federal abstention in the domestic law
area,96 it seems clear that these considerations do not provide
a jurisdictional barrier to habeas corpus.97
Ultimately, federal court reliance on traditional federal
89. Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 1975); In re Freiberg, 262
F. Supp. 482, 484 (E.D. La. 1967); Note, supra note 44, at 275.
90. Exparte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 591 (1890).
91. See also Matters v. Ryan, 249 U.S. 375, 377 (1919) (court did not have federal
habeas jurisdiction over child custody dispute because "the case made involved no
Federal question adequate to sustain the jurisdiction").
92. 136 U.S. 586, 591-95 (1890).
93. Id at 591; Note, supra note 50, at 347.
94. Burrus, 136 U.S. at 596. See also Matters v. Ryan, 249 U.S. 375, 378 (1919).
95. Note, supra note 50, at 352.
96. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
97. Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599, 602 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1981); Nguyen Da Yen v.
Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1202-03 & n. 15 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Freiberg, 262 F. Supp.
482, 484 (E.D. La. 1967).
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abstention in domestic relations cases to justify denial of fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction over constitutional challenges
to state child custody judgments is misplaced. The question
in these cases only incidentally involves domestic relations.
The issue in cases such as Lehman is not who shall have
custody98 of the child or even whether the petitioner-parent's
rights should have been terminated, 99 but rather the consti-
tutional sufficiency of the state court proceedings. 1°° The
federal court need not decide the issues of custody or termi-
nation of parental rights. After establishing the minimum
standards required for constitutionality, the state court can
decide, in accordance with the constitutional standards man-
dated by the federal court, in whose custody the child shall
be placed and whether the parent's rights should be termi-
nated. The questions raised in these habeas corpus proceed-
ings are not questions of domestic law. They are
constitutional questions.' 0' The Court has often dealt with
98. Note, supra note 44, at 279. Cf. Note, supra note 45, at 1436. The question of
who will win custody of the child is not the issue in habeas corpus proceedings. See
Pukas v. Pukas, 129 W. Va. 765, _, 42 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1947) ("Speaking strictly, the
writ of habeas corpus involves only the question of whether the detention of the body
of an individual is lawful or unlawful and the writ, if made permanent, simply re-
stores freedom to the individual whose restraint is involved."); See Oaks, supra note
48, at 273 n.157 ("If one of two parties unlawfully restrain and imprison the person
about whom the contest arises, the writ steps in and relieves from restraint, but leaves
the contest, as to possession, to be decided in another mode.") (quoting State v.
Cheeseman, 5 N.J.L. 522, 525 (1819)); Note, supra note 44, at 272 ("Unless a statute
grants the state courts power to change custody in the habeas proceeding, the states
follow English practice in limiting the scope of the common law hearing to the ques-
tion of whether a child is in unlawful custody with reference to a preexisting custody
right." (footnotes omitted)).
99. Lehman, 648 F.2d at 154 (concurring opinion), 156 (dissenting opinion), af'd,
102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982). Cf. Note, supra note 45, at 1436.
100. In 1981 the United States Supreme Court maintained that "notwithstanding
the limited application of federal law in the field of domestic relations generally...
this court, even in that area, has not hesitated to protect, under the Supremacy Clause,
rights and expectancies established by federal law against the operation of state law."
Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54 (1981).
101. Lehman, 648 F.2d at 154 (concurring opinion), 156 (dissenting opinion),
affid, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982). See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964) (insula-
tion from federal judicial review not present when state power used to circumvent a
federally protected right); Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599, 602 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1981)
("[Tihe usual deference to state courts in domestic law questions will not bar federal
review of constitutional issues." (emphasis added)); Sylvander v. New England Home
for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1111 (Ist Cir. 1978) ("The sole federal interest is
in the constitutional issues collateral to [the question of custody]."); Nguyen Da Yen
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child custody or termination of parental rights in the context
of constitutional challenges.102 This precariously contrived
domestic relations exception to federal habeas corpus juris-
diction cannot validly be relied upon to deny federal review
of important constitutional issues.
C Standing and The "Next Friend" Petition
Although the majority opinion in Lehman did not ad-
dress the question of Ms. Lehman's standing 0 3 to act as
"next friend" petitioner' ° in behalf of her children, serious
doubts have been raised by courts and commentators about
the propriety of the assertion of a federal habeas corpus
claim by a parent in behalf of his or her child when the par-
ent's parental rights have been terminated. 0 5  The "next
friend" petition is a common law tradition permitting habeas
corpus petitions by a third party where the person in custody
is unable to assert his own claims. 0 6 The statute provides
that an application for habeas corpus must be signed and
verified by the person in custody or by someone "acting in
his behalf."' 10 7
In the majority of cases where a parent has acted as a
child's next friend petitioner, the parent's standing to act in
v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1202-03 & n.15 (9th Cir. 1975) ("While most private
detentions (and child custody conflicts) do not rise to the level of constitutional viola-
tions, the governmental involvement. . . exercised. . . does present that possibility
here, and habeas jurisdiction is proper."); Oaks, supra note 48, at 273 n.157; Note,
supra note 44, at 267 ("[L]imiting the writ to its traditional purpose - to free children
from illegal custody rather than to determine their best interest - would infringe
upon no valid state prerogatives in child custody matters.").
Federal courts generally have refused to hear cases relating to child custody or
"domestic relations" because they involve merely private matters historically handled
by the states. However, where the questions arise out of a state court judgment, there
is sufficient state action to bring these cases within the civil rights statutes enacted
pursuant to the fourteen amendment. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 11-12, 14-
18 (1948).
102. Note, supra note 50, at 353. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
103. But see Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 102 S. Ct.
3231, 3244 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. See supra note 37.
105. Note, supra note 45, at 1439.
106. Id at 1438.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1976).
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behalf of his or her child has not been questioned. 108 Parents
traditionally have been considered to have standing to act in
behalf of their children.109 Nevertheless, habeas corpus peti-
tions filed by parents in behalf of their children have been
denied where the parent's parental rights have been
terminated."0
Although generally it is presumed that a parent acts in
his or her child's best interest,"'I the courts have abandoned
this presumption in cases involving a termination of parental
rights. 2 The reasoning behind such a determination is that
the state court has based its decision to terminate the par-
ent's rights on a finding that it is no longer in the child's best
interest to be in the custody of that parent) 3 Thus, a parent
whose rights have been terminated presumably is not acting
in the child's best interest and not, therefore, in the child's
behalf, when he or she seeks through habeas corpus to
regain custody of the child. 14
108. Note, supra note 45, at 1438.
109. Oaks, supra note 48, at 270; Note, supra note 50, at 354 & nn.96, 97. For
examples of cases where parents have filed habeas petitions on behalf of their chil-
dren, see Walden v. Walden, 355 So. 2d 372 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978); McNeal v. Maho-
ney, 117 Ariz. 543, 574 P.2d 31 (1977); Tilden v. Locke, 383 So. 2d 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); Hilliard v. Hilliard, 243 Ga. 424, 254 S.E.2d 372 (1979); People ex rel.
Elmore v. Elmore, 46 Ill. App. 3d 504, 361 N.E.2d 615 (1977); Jolly v. Avery, 220
Kan. 694, 556 P.2d 449 (1976); Stelly v. Montgomery, 347 So. 2d 1145 (La. 1977);
Garza v. Shoffner, 386 So. 2d 397 (Miss. 1980); M.P.M. v. Williams, 611 S.W.2d 274
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980); People ex rel Kourland v. Kourland, 54 A.D.2d 638, 387
N.Y.S.2d 620 (1976); Mansukhani v. Pailing, 300 N.W.2d 847 (N.D. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 102 S. Ct. 98 (1981), appeal after remand, 318 N.W.2d 748 (N.D. 1982), Gerald
G. v. Theresa G., 284 Pa. Super. 498, 426 A.2d 157 (1981); Strobel v. Thurman, 565
S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1978); In re Becker's Welfare, 87 Wash. 2d 470, 553 P.2d 1339
(1976); Anderson v. Anderson, 36 Wis. 2d 455, 153 N.W.2d 627 (1967).
110. Generally, these cases emphasize the petitioner's lack of concern with the
legality of the state statute pursuant to which the child has been placed in state cus-
tody. The petitioner is said to be interested only in her parental rights to custody and
not in any liberty interest of the child. See e.g., Sylvander v. New England Home for
Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1111 (1st Cir. 1978).
111. Note, supra note 45, at 1438.
112. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-52 (1972); Sylvander v. New England
Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1111 (1st Cir. 1978). The cases "empha-
size that [the next friend petition] is not intended as a vehicle for the next friend to
assert his own rights under the fiction of vindicating the rights of the person in cus-
tody." Note, supra note 45, at 1438.
113. Lehman, 648 F.2d at 138 n.2.
114. Note, supra note 45, at 1438. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013-14
(1976) (next friend status denied to Gary Gilmore's mother because Gilmore had
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Denial of a parent's standing to file a petition for writ of
habeas corpus to regain custody of a child is indefensible for
a number of reasons. The very question in issue in these
habeas corpus proceedings is whether a petitioner's child has
been illegally placed in the state's custody, that is, whether
the custody is in violation of federal law' 15 because the state
proceedings resulting in the state's custody of the child -
and resulting in the termination of the petitioner's parental
rights - failed to meet minimum constitutional standards.
To deny a petitioner's right to bring an action in habeas
corpus in behalf of a child because his or her parental rights
have been terminated assumes the legal validity of the very
judgment being attacked. Such circular reasoning defies the
fundamental distinction between standing and the merits of
a case. 1
6
Moreover, the fact that a person's parental rights have
been terminated simply does not deprive that person of
standing to sue as "next friend" on behalf of his or her chil-
dren. Parents in child custody disputes historically have had
standing to petition for the writ to obtain custody of their
children,' 17 even where the petitioners sought the habeas pe-
tition at least partially in their own behalf."" Anyone who
has an interest in the welfare of an infant - anyone who
may have a grievance or a cause of action - qualifies as that
infant's "next friend."' 19 The petitioner need only be "some
person who has a legally justified interest in [the child's]
freedom, such as father, son, brother, or aunt. . . 120
The United States Supreme Court frequently has empha-
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights and desired execution); King v. McLean
Asylum of the Mass. Gen. Hosp., 64 F. 331, 356 (1894) (" 'When a party comes here,
using the privilege of acting on the behalf and as the next friend of infants, it is his
bounden duty to show that he really acts for the benefit of the infants, and not to
promote purposes of his own."' (quoting Lord Langdale)); Evans v. Bennett, 467 F.
Supp. 1108, 1111 (S.D. Ala. 1979) (next friend status denied where prisoner desired
execution).
115. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
116. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 & n.18 (1979); Data Processing
Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
117. Note, supra note 50, at 354.
118. Oaks, supra note 48, at 270.
119. Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
120. Pukas v. Pukas, 129 W. Va. 765, _, 42 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1947).
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sized the importance of the family.12 ' The right to raise
one's own children has been deemed "essential,"'' 22 a "basic
civil right of man,"'' 23 and a "[right far more precious...
than property rights."' 124 The natural family unit has found
protection in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, 25 the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment 26 and the ninth amendment. 27 Unquestiona-
bly, a parent whose parental rights have been terminated in
a state court proceeding shares with his or her child a vital
interest in preventing erroneous termination of the natural
parent-child relationship. 28 Indeed, the deprivation of pa-
rental rights constitutes a significant restraint on the liberty
of the parent 29 as well as on the liberty of the child, such
that a person whose parental rights have been terminated
has standing to file a petition on his or her own behalf to
challenge the constitutionality of that infringement upon the
parent's liberty interest in the care, custody and control of
the child.
III. CONCLUSION
The Lehman decision is not surprising in light of the
present Court's retrenchment in the area of federal constitu-
tional safeguards 30 and in particular, its recent trend to re-
strict the constitutional right to habeas corpus. '3'
Nevertheless, the Court's denial of federal habeas jurisdic-
121. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
122. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
123. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
124. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
125. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
126. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
127. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
128. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 & n.11, 765 (1982).
129. Id at 753.
130. See O'Connor, Trends in the Relationshp Between the Federal and State
Courts From the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 802
(1981). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). It is interesting to note, however, the Court's
"historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ."
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977). This tendency seems to primarily turn
on policy considerations. Note, supra note 45, at 1440.
131. O'Connor, supra note 130, at 803; Note, supra note 50, at 344.
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tion over state child custody cases is unfounded. The juris-
dictional prerequisite of "custody" clearly is met. 32
Federalism concerns and traditional federal abstention in
domestic relations cases do not serve to bar federal habeas
jurisdiction.133 These issues go "rather to the appropriate ex-
ercise of that power." 34 The Supreme Court has long recog-
nized that considerations of comity may sometimes require a
federal court to forego the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion. 35 The question to be decided in all cases is whether
the circumstances are sufficient to invoke the discretionary
refusal to exercise this federal power. 36 Where the sole issue
to be decided, however, is a federal constitutional question
concerning the validity of a state statute or the enforcement
of a state court order, discretionary refusal to exercise fed-
eral jurisdiction on the basis of federalism concerns is
unjustified.
KATHLEEN ANNE BARRETT
132. See supra text accompanying notes 43-79.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 80-102.
134. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1976).
135. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 425-26 (1963).
136. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1976). See also Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 478 n.ll, 495 n.37 (1976).
[Vol. 66:567
